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Introduction
For years, banking was considered the paragon
of stable employment. Since peaking in 1989,
however, the industry’s payrolls have shrunk—
in marked contrast to the expansion of the U.S.
labor force and the growth in overall employ-
ment (see figure 1). Furthermore, the contrac-
tion has been steady, apparently unaffected by
the aggregate business cycle. Between 1989
and 1995, banking employment fell more than
6 percent, while aggregate output in the indus-
try (measured by total assets) increased 15 per-
cent in real terms. Clearly, this differs from the
situation in the U.S. steel industry during the
1970s, when a decline in demand for the indus-
try’s output provided an easy explanation for
the employment loss.
Ready explanations for the contraction in
banking employment have not been lacking.
Casual observation of industry patterns from
1988 to the present suggests that two impor-
tant changes have coincided with the shift in
demand for banking labor: Technology has
revolutionized the way banking is done, and
consolidation has transformed banking’s
industrial structure.
Technical progress may have obvious effects
on labor demand. For example, all else equal, a
firm may choose to employ fewer workers if
the price of a substitute for labor goes down.
The explosion in the number of ATM transac-
tions in the 1980s is often cited as a primary
reason for banking’s dwindling payrolls (see
figure 2). Even the name—automated teller
machine—suggests the substitution use.
But a closer look suggests that the effect of
technical progress may be more complex. Be-
cause they offer new opportunities to banks,
ATMs may expand the range and amount of
output that banks sell. The most visible effect 
of ATMs has been to transform the multitude of
fully staffed branch offices that existed in the
1970s into today’s sparsely staffed single branch.
However, ATMs also offer services that were 
not easily obtainable 20 years ago, like allowing
people to get cash easily, even at out-of-the-
way places. Thus, it’s possible that more bank
services are being used, which should have a
positive effect on employment.
Although ATMs are the most visible sign of
technical progress to customers, they are not
the only example of banks’ adopting new tech-
nology. Some technical changes, like cash
sorters and electronic readers, are embodied in
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new machinery. Other advances are less obvi-
ous, but may be just as important. For example,
an accurate formula for assessing a loan’s risk
may allow a bank to substitute a small amount
of an unskilled employee’s time for that of a
highly paid loan officer. Clearly, technology
enters into a bank’s employment decision in
subtle and complex ways.1
One of the purposes of this paper is to doc-
ument the effects of technical change on the
demand for banking labor. Technical change is
difficult to measure, however, so I approximate
it by using the variable time for the period be-
tween 1984:IQ and 1996:IVQ. Because the use
of ATM machines seems to approach a linear
function of time during this interval, time may
be a good proxy for technical progress when
other, more easily measured labor demand fac-
tors are held constant. I also address a number
of other questions, such as, when faced with
the same measured economic environment,
how many workers are employed by a bank
today compared with the same bank a decade
ago? How much of the decline in labor demand
can be traced to “technical progress?” And how
does technical progress differ in its effect on
large versus small banks?
The second major development in banking
over the last 10 years is the dramatic shift in
industry composition, which has radically
transformed the nature of banking employ-
ment.2 While banking output (measured by
total assets) has steadily increased, the number
of individual banks has steadily fallen (see fig-
ure 3). This compositional change could affect
the industry’s demand for labor in several
ways. A smaller bank’s being swallowed by a
bank holding company could result in dupli-
cate positions being eliminated in research,
marketing, management, and so on. Moreover,
entire branches with duplicate functions could
be wiped out.3
This paper also addresses some intriguing
questions about the impact of this composi-
tional change on labor demand. How is a
banking organization’s total employment
F I G U R E 1
U.S. Employment
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics.
F I G U R E 2
ATM Usea
a. Based on Federal Reserve System estimates.
SOURCE: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
F I G U R E 3
U.S. Commercial Banking
a. Includes total loans and securities; seasonally adjusted data.
SOURCES: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System; and Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation.
n 1 See Griliches (1995) for an examination of the complexity of
technical change in empirical estimation.
n 2 For a detailed look at the change in industry composition, see
Humphrey (1993), Berger, Kashyap, and Scalise (1995), Boyd and Gertler
(1995), and Humphrey and Pulley (1997).
n 3 Much of the anecdotal literature on the impact of mergers con-
centrates on gross employment effects, rather than on the net effects
examined here. Thus, a management purge aimed at making a takeover
easier would not affect net employment if replacements (presumably more
docile workers) were hired from the outside.
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affected by an acquisition?4  That is, how does
the post-acquisition picture differ from the
defacto organization made up of the sum of
the banks involved in the takeover? And which
banking organization is most affected by an
acquisition—the acquiring bank holding com-
pany or its target? 
The next section lays out some of the theo-
retical and empirical issues surrounding labor
demand in the banking industry. Section II then
reports estimates of labor demand when the
observation unit is a single firm, and section III
uses a sample of acquisitions to explore how
consolidation may affect employment. Section
IV summarizes and concludes.
I. Labor Demand
Estimation
Interpretations of the labor demand estimates
reported here must be sensitive to a number of
factors, including the formal static theory of
labor demand implicitly assumed in the discus-
sion, the limitations of the data used, and the
way that industrial consolidation is handled.
This paper adopts a static analysis. Thus, even
though many short-run dynamics may be affect-
ing labor demand, the issues of interest lie not
in the dynamics of adjustment, but rather in the
magnitude of long-run demand. I concentrate
on the long-run elasticity of demand with re-
spect to wages, the effects of changing prices of
close substitutes for labor, and the effects of a
change in banking’s industrial structure.
The point of departure for most static input
demand studies is the cost function (see Berger
and Humphrey [1992, 1997]). These papers
summarize a wide literature that estimates cost
functions for the banking industry, often gen-
erated with the same call report data used in
this paper. However, their emphasis is usually
on efficiency (broken down by category), not
on overall labor demand. Indeed, this literature
is so focused on efficiency that, often, the coeffi-
cients of the cost function required to derive the
labor demand elasticities are not even reported.
Rather, the papers report efficiency statistics de-
rived from the behavior of residuals from the
estimated cost function.
If we had all the correct prices faced by indi-
vidual firms, as well as their input amounts,
then the cost function could be written as 
C(Q, P), where Q is a vector of outputs and 
P is a vector of input prices. When viewed this
way, unique problems posed by the banking
industry become evident. For instance, what 
is an output and what is an input? Researchers
have proposed several solutions to this ques-
tion.5  Outputs are usually multivalued, because
it is unclear whether deposits, for example, 
represent inputs or outputs, and whether loans
should be considered a primary output or be
broken into separate categories. In the banking
cost-function literature, Q is often composed 
of four outputs: deposits and three categories
of loans—commercial/industrial, real estate,
and other. Inputs are usually composed of
labor, physical capital, and funds available from
sources other than deposits. The reason for this
particular breakdown is not that it is the best
possible statistical model of banking industry
behavior. Rather, it represents a huge compro-
mise forced on the researcher because of the
available data.
The major source of firm-level data for the
banking industry is the call report, which every
bank in the United States is required to file on a
quarterly basis. Included are details on an insti-
tution’s balance sheet, earnings, and expenses,
as well as the number of “full-time equivalent”
employees at the end of the reporting period.6
Because these data are collected for regulatory
purposes, they have advantages and disadvan-
tages for the empirical researcher. On the plus
side, the data set is large, embracing the entire
banking industry. Also, because the information
is collected from the same forms, it is compara-
ble across banks. On the minus side, the data
are not collected for the purpose of input de-
mand estimation. This leads to major problems,
some of which can be illustrated by looking at
the measurement of changes that occur within
a single bank.
Differentiating the cost function with respect
to an input price yields (through Shepherd’s
lemma) an output constant demand curve for
its associated input:
(1)   = Li(Q,P).
Here, the ith input is denoted as Li. This is an
incomplete demand curve in that it does not in-
clude the changes that might occur if the quan-
tities associated with the output vector were
allowed to vary. For example, a wage change
could affect the firm’s demand for labor in sev-
eral ways. First, if labor costs increase, the firm
n 4 An acquisition is distinguished from a merger in that a merger
wipes out the charter of one of the banks, whereas an acquisition allows
both the acquirer and the acquired firm to retain their charters. 
n 5 See Fixler (1992) for a discussion of the cost-function 
specification.
n 6 A full-time equivalent number is obtained by adding up the
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may decrease its output and thus reduce its 
use of the labor input. Second, even if output
remains constant, the firm will substitute the
now relatively cheaper inputs for the more
expensive labor. Measurement of equation (1)
tells us something only about the second effect.7
The output constant demand curve implies
an estimating equation that poses some meas-
ure of labor employed by a firm as a function of
wages, prices of physical capital and funds, de-
posits, and levels of the various loan outputs.
Suppose we were to estimate the constant wage
elasticity demand function
(2)  lnLit = b1 + b2lnWit + b3lnPkit
+ b4t + Xitg + eit,
where L is employment,W is the wage rate, Pk
is the price of capital, X is a row vector of other
included variables in the demand equation, and
g is a column vector of the parameters to be
estimated. The parameter b is often of chief
interest. Equation (2), when fitted to call report
data, must be interpreted with caution in light of
recent developments in the banking industry.
Some of the important variables driving
labor demand, including new techniques for
evaluating loan applications, will not have an
available proxy in the call report data. These
variables are subsumed in the general interpre-
tation of the coefficients of variables involving
time. Perhaps more important are issues of
aggregation. Many different labor types are
combined into the single variable L, provided
by the call report. Theory suggests that aggre-
gation over a group of inputs, i = 1...m,
requires the cost function to be written as
(3) C (y, P1,...P m,P m+1,...P n) 
= C [y, u(P1,...P m ),P m+1,...P n],
where u is a price index that aggregates the
prices P1,...P m. A sufficient condition for (3) to
be true is that the production function must be
strongly separable between the group of
inputs, i = 1...m, and all of the other inputs.
There is some a priori evidence that this is not
the case. For example, data from other indus-
tries suggest that skilled labor is complementary
to capital inputs. Furthermore, technical change
may be easier to accomplish if workers are
more skilled. An examination of the occupa-
tional makeup of the banking industry suggests
that workers are indeed more skilled than they
were 20 years ago (see figure 4). Recent work
by Demsetz (1997) reinforces this finding,
showing that the skill set of bankers, like the
skill set of workers in all financial, insurance,
and real estate industries, has steadily increased
over the last decade. Without more evidence,
the direction of the bias for technical change
estimates is hard to determine. 
The best policy at this point is to use cau-
tion when interpreting estimates of labor de-
mand based on call report data. Similar caveats
apply to the physical capital variable, clearly
an aggregation over many types and vintages.
Buildings probably interact with labor in a fun-
damentally different way than an ATM does, 
so elasticities with respect to the capital vari-
able computed from call report data should 
be viewed circumspectly.
A second way the firm’s decisions will affect
employment is more lumpy. The firm decides
whether to open or close a plant, or, more dras-
tically, whether to go out of business.8  In the
context of banking, this means that a bank de-
cides whether to open or close a branch office,
as banks generally reorganize through mergers
or acquisitions rather than going out of busi-
ness. Of approximately 9,000 banks operating in
the United States during the mid-1990s, fewer
than 20 failed each year. In addition, many new
banks were chartered during the same period.
n 7 Differentiation of equation (1) with respect to Pj and a simple
application of Young’s theorem lead to the symmetry restrictions of convex
analysis: =  . These restrictions are usually rejected in cost 
function analyses of the banking industry. Given this, I concentrate on sim-
ple demand functions in what follows.
n 8 Obviously, the latter decision is sometimes imposed on the firm
from the outside.
F I G U R E 4
Occupational Mix in Banking
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This paper concentrates on the patterns sur-
rounding bank acquisitions in order to examine
the structural changes that have taken place in
the industry. There are several compelling rea-
sons for adopting this approach. First, acquisi-
tions account for at least half the consolidation
in the banking industry when measured by
number of events. Recent evidence indicates
that, relative to mergers, acquisitions are in-
creasing in importance. Second, acquisitions 
do not destroy the target as a data-reporting
organization, meaning that we can empirically
observe both the acquirer and its target in the
period following a takeover.
Thus, I examine changes in the long-run de-
mand for banking labor using two approaches.
The first concentrates on the behavior of a
single firm as it minimizes costs subject to a
changing environment. The second looks at two
organizations—the acquiring bank holding
company and its target—as they adjust to an
acquisition. The next section looks at the be-
havior of single banks.
II. Full-Sample 
Estimates
The call report data examined here embrace
the entire U.S. banking industry, with more
than 9,000 quarterly observations. Clearly, a
data set this rich can be analyzed in several
ways. I first look at raw averages computed for
several classes of banks over different periods.
These numbers are helpful in detecting broad
patterns in the data. However, they are less
useful in answering the question more relevant
to policymakers, that is, how has banks’ de-
mand for labor changed, abstracting from the
effect of other measured changes in their eco-
nomic environment? If, for example, average
employment has decreased and average wages
have increased, then it is difficult to tell from
simple averages whether the employment loss
is due to higher wages or secular changes
(such as technical progress) that are altering
the labor demand curve. The discussion pro-
gresses from simple averages, to holding meas-
ured variables in the data set constant through
regression analysis, to holding unmeasured
individual characteristics of each bank constant
through fixed-effect models. I start with the
simple averages.
Table 1 summarizes the labor and wage data
by asset class for each of the five years in the
sample. Asset size is expressed in real 1984 dol-
lars, so that the structure of the industry reflects
T A B L E 1
Employment and Wages 
by Bank Size
$100 $500 More
$0–$100 million– million–  than
Banks Assets:a million $500 million $5 billion $5 billion
1984
Number of banks 6,014 1,775 385 47
Employment/bankb 39.8 150.5 1,106.3 10,308.1
(22.8) (89.2) (845.5) (12,940.3)
Wagec 5.04 5.15 5.71 6.96
(2.01) (0.95) (1.16) (1.30)
Assets/workerd 1,421 1,406 1,536 1,712
1987
Number of banks 6,645 1,914 417 67
Employment/bank 35.6 138.4 1,008.0 8,400.1
(20.2) (100.1) (785.4) (10,477)
Wage 5.29 5.45 6.02 7.49
(1.20) (1.22) (1.48) (2.00)
Assets/worker 1,493 1,600 1,795 1,928
1990
Number of banks 6,531 1,768 406 77
Employment/bank 34.2 139.8 1,005.7 7,686.3
(20.0) (82.9) (803.4) (8,970.8)
Wage 5.32 5.53 6.09 7.52
(1.31) (1.98) (1.74) (2.41)
Assets/worker 1,481 1,668 2,284 2,234
1993
Number of banks 6,641 1,637 401 75
Employment/bank 33.4 137.7 947.3 7,950.4
(21.8) (82.9) (810.4) (10,833.3)
Wage 5.38 5.64 6.46 8.09
(1.34) (3.00) (3.65) (3.58)
Assets/worker 1,451 1,615 2,647 2,128
1996
Number of banks 5,901 1,569 392 86
Employment/bank 33.2 132.7 845.2 8,023.1
(21.9) (80.1) (711) (9,617.7)
Wage 5.54 5.84 6.69 8.14
(1.37) (1.80) (2.53) (3.55)
Assets/worker 1,463 1,663 4,585 2,196
a. Real 1984 dollars.
b. Full-time equivalent employees per chartered bank.
c. Thousands of 1984 dollars per full-time equivalent worker per quarter.
d. Thousands of 1984 dollars per full-time equivalent worker.
NOTE: Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations. Footnotes b, c, and d
apply to all years.
SOURCE: Author’s calculations based on call report data.
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genuine growth in bank size rather than an arti-
fice of inflation. Several patterns are evident. To
begin with, larger banks are more important
employers than smaller banks. Although firms
in the smallest two asset categories accounted
for 95 percent of all U.S. banks in 1984, they
employed only about a third of the industry’s
workforce. This pattern was even more pro-
nounced in 1996, when the smaller banks
accounted for 94 percent of banks by number,
but only 28 percent of total employment.
Another important finding is that in every
year, larger banks pay a higher average wage.
Furthermore, the large institutions differ from
the small ones in the rate at which they have
adjusted to the changes of the last decade. All
bank categories paid a higher average real wage
in 1996 than in 1984. However, the increase for
small banks was only 10 percent, whereas for
large banks it was 17 percent.9 Also, banks in
every size grouping saw their employment lev-
els go down, but smaller firms still had an aver-
age employment of about 83 percent of 1984
levels, while larger banks trimmed their payrolls
to 77 percent of their former size.
It is interesting to note that banks are getting
bigger (in terms of total assets) and that larger
banks have more assets per employee. How-
ever, the same trend is not evident for smaller
institutions. Based on the data presented in
table 1, it is hard to reject the notion that smaller
banks may have reduced their employment
because they have fewer assets to manage. The
same cannot be said for the largest banks, par-
ticularly those in the $500 million to $5 billion
category. Clearly, large banks are different insti-
tutions from the point of view of labor demand.
The patterns reported in table 1 must be con-
sidered when conducting a regression analysis.
A simple labor demand function derived from
the firm’s static cost-minimization problem rep-
resented by equation (2) is reported in table 2.
The data represent ordinary least squares (OLS)
regressions of log labor on outputs and inputs,
prices of substitute inputs, time, and structure
variables. Of course, other specifications were
tried, but the general pattern of results remained
the same. First, the output constant wage elas-
ticity of labor demand is about 40 percent; that
is, for every 10 percent rise in the wage rate,
the firm’s demand for labor decreases by 4 per-
cent. This is lower than many estimates for
manufacturing (which cluster around unity),
but is still well within the wide band of esti-
mated elasticities reported for the service sector
(see Hamermesh [1986, 1993]). Second, it is
clear from the table that capital is a much-used
substitute for labor. Its cross-price elasticity is
quite high at 40 percent, indicating that the
price of overnight funds does not affect the
demand for labor.
All of a bank’s outputs seem to require labor
in the sense that the coefficients of outputs are
positive. The easiest loans to service appear to
be real estate and commercial/industrial loans.
Core deposits are the most labor intensive
input/output. Ceteris paribus, a 10 percent
increase in deposits will boost the demand for
labor by 3 percent. This is compatible with the
view of banks as firms that use labor to service
cheap deposits (relative to the funds market)
and convert them into loans.
Although much of the recent research has
focused on the structure of the banking indus-
try, when it comes to employment variation, the
prima facie evidence indicates that the unexam-
ined seasonal component may be more impor-
tant. Employment in the summer and fall quar-
ters declines 2 percent relative to the spring
(April–June) quarter. Belonging to a bank hold-
ing company is associated with an employment
decrease of slightly less than 2 percent.10
The table 2 regressions show that labor de-
mand has clearly shifted over the last decade.
The coefficient of the time variable, which rep-
resents the number of quarters from the begin-
ning of the sample period in 1984:IQ, indicates
that employment at a firm having the same
price structure and the same loan and deposit
portfolio declines by half a percentage point
per quarter. This stunning observation is the
focus of the regression reported in the second
column of table 2.
The second regression looks at the time pat-
tern of labor employment by examining the
coefficients on two variables defined as prod-
ucts of time and another variable. The first vari-
able is time multiplied by the dummy variable
for the firm’s holding company status. In this
case, the interpretation of the coefficient is the
effect of time on banks that belong to bank
holding companies, compared to the effect of
time on the reference group of independent
banks. The second variable is time multiplied by
the logarithm of total assets held by the bank.
Here, the interpretation of the coefficient is
analogous: Compared to a bank with few assets,
what is the effect of time on larger banks? A
negative coefficient indicates that larger banks
have experienced a greater percentage decline
in employment demand.
n 9 This occurred despite the fact that the largest banks were al-
ready paying their workers more in 1984 than small banks paid in 1996.
n 10 The coefficient of this variable compares bank holding company
members to a reference group of independent banks.
http://clevelandfed.org/research/review/
Economic Review 1997 Q329
This is exactly what is found—not a surpris-
ing result given the averages reported in table
1. An independent bank of average asset size
(logarithm of total assets of 10) experiences no
discernible employment decline over the sam-
ple period, holding wages and all else constant.
A huge bank (logarithm of assets equal to 18)
experiences a drop of nearly 40 percent. Inter-
estingly, larger banks seemed to have started
the period with higher employment for the
same variables than did smaller banks. Some of
this decline may have resulted from a shift out
of scale diseconomies.
The regressions reported in the first two col-
umns of table 2 leave out many possible vari-
ables that might be included in labor demand.
Some of these may exist in call report data.
Others are measured poorly, if at all, by any
data. An example of the latter is managerial
taste in using new machinery. To the extent that
this factor is correlated with labor demand and
with an included variable (such as the price of
physical capital), bias can result.
To compensate for this problem, I added a
“fixed effect” to the error scheme. In a sense,
this is necessary to maintain the interpretation
of a firm’s cost-minimizing labor demand. The
coefficient of interest is the effect on a single
firm’s employment policy if a change occurs in
a measured variable, such as wages. How do
such measured environmental shifts affect the
firm’s decisions, holding all else constant? A
fixed effect decomposes the unobserved error
term into two terms:
(5) e = ei + eit,
where the firm fixed effect, ei, may be corre-
lated with included observed variables. The
fixed effect accounts for idiosyncratic elements
facing the firm, such as local conditions, that
remain somewhat constant over time.
The last column of table 2 reports the results
from these regressions. The estimates are com-
puted with consistent standard errors under a
wide variety of assumptions, and are balanced
to account for the possibly different number of
time-series observations per bank. The standard
errors and estimated coefficients are consistent,
for example, if the nonidiosyncratic error for
each observation, eit, is correlated through an
autoregressive process with the error in the
prior period, eit –1. 
For the most part, the fixed-effects regres-
sions yield similar estimates to the middle-
column regression. However, there are some
differences that may reflect how local condi-
tions or management traditions are correlated
T A B L E 2
Log Labor Demand 
Regressions
Variable Ordinary Least Squares Fixed Effects
Intercept –2.648 –4.001 –4.149
(317.8) (329.0) (51.4)
Log wage –0.419 –0.324  –0.250
(223.9) (474.7) (34.8)
Log price capital 0.408 0.476 0.112 
(589.9) (474.7) (34.6)
Log price funds –0.0005 –0.0005 –0.002
(0.478) (5.31) (2.4)
Log real estate loans 0.0116 0.0149 0.009
(32.2) (45.9) (7.5)
Log commercial/ 0.0191 0.0123 0.0225
industrial loans (43.1) (30.7) (10.7)
Log other loans 0.185 0.055  0.0815
(232.1) (66.2) (15.5)
Log core deposits 0.314 0.077 0.0814
(285.1) (60.2) (5.3)
Spring 0.0055 0.0053 0.005
(4.79) (5.18) (16.1)
Summer –0.0157 –0.009 –0.005
(13.2) (8.7) (13.4)
Fall –0.0159 –0.0044 –0.004
(13.1) (4.02) (6.6)
Bank holding  –0.0187 –0.0177 0.0148
company (18.7) (10.1) (3.5)
Bank holding  –0.0178 –0.0005
company * time (10.18) (3.5)
Time –0.00570 0.00132 0.0110
(129.3) (39.8) (9.8)
Log total assets 0.509 0.535
(286.8) (30.4)
Log total  –0.00135 –0.00106
assets * time (44.5) (10.2)
Number of observations 399,266 399,266 395,000
Number of banks 12,664 12,664 12,255
NOTE: Numbers in parentheses are t ratios.
SOURCE: Author’s calculations based on call report data.
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with the variable whose coefficient changes.
First, the wage elasticity of demand is somewhat
smaller for the fixed-effect estimates. Second,
the cross-price elasticity of capital is much
smaller. This may be because banks paying a
higher price for capital in a cross-section also
require more labor. This cross-sectional varia-
tion is less interesting than the average variation
within a single bank’s behavior because the lat-
ter is more useful in answering the question, “If
a policy were to change the price of capital fac-
ing a single bank, how would that bank alter its
employment?” The fixed-effect estimates indi-
cate that the impact of a technical innovation
that lowers the price of capital by 10 percent
should reduce employment by only 1 percent.
The fixed-effect estimates differ from the
OLS estimates most radically with respect to the
bank structure variables. The coefficient of
belonging to a bank holding company is now
positive and significant, and the cross-time
effect, though still negative, is much smaller.
The total effect of being in a bank holding
company is slightly positive at the beginning of
the sample period and then decreases to a neg-
ligible amount by the end of the period. This
contrasts with the OLS estimates, which imply a
negative employment effect at the beginning of
the sample period that increases to 70 percent
by the end of the period. 
The difference in estimates may be due to an
underlying unobserved factor in a bank’s labor
policy that also makes it more likely to be part
of a bank holding company. Although this
unobserved factor is reflected in the simple OLS
estimates, it is purged in the fixed-effect data. 
In predicting employment trends for the next
decade, analysts must be more concerned about
the effect of consolidation on a bank’s employ-
ment policy than about the underlying policies
of banks that happen to be consolidated.
This makes the fixed-effect estimate, which
shows that consolidation has only a minimal
impact on bank employment, more relevant. 
A Hausman–Wu test rejects the random-effects
model at any reasonable level of significance
with a p value of 3x10-7. Clearly, local condi-
tions affect how a bank employs labor, and
these conditions cannot be entirely accounted
for through use of the simple measured vari-
ables employed here. They are correlated with
wages, the price of capital, and especially the
effect of bank structure over time in such a
way that studies excluding unobserved local
effects will yield misleading results. In particu-
lar, consolidation seems to matter little for 
labor demand. Below, I explore this issue more
closely by looking at how participants in a sam-
ple of acquisitions reacted to consolidation.
III. Effects of 
Acquisitions
We can observe the effect of consolidation
more directly by looking at a subsample of
banks acquired in the 1984–94 period. I col-
lected data on 200 acquisitions, covering both
the acquiring banking organization and its tar-
get bank. In all cases, the target institution was
an independent bank. Such a criterion was
much too restrictive for the acquirer, however,
essentially ruling out all acquisitions except of
one small rural bank by another. In the case of
a bank holding company, I aggregated all of
the banks in the organization (except for the
target of the current acquisition) into a defacto
“superbank.” Both banks (the acquiring organi-
zation and its target) could then be compared
before and after the acquisition. Note that the
fictional organization of the acquiring bank
holding company formed by the sum of its
component banks stays constant throughout
the comparison period. I look at the broad
patterns suggested both by averages over the
periods surrounding the acquisition and by
regression analyses.
Table 3 presents some of these averages,
comparing the post-acquisition institution with
the same bank two quarters prior to takeover.
The top number is the mean difference in log
employment after the acquisition, the value in
parentheses is the p value for the hypothesis of
no difference, and the bottom number is the
total number of acquisitions included in the
mean. Thus, the first entry under “acquiring
bank” indicates that the acquiring banking orga-
nization increased its employment about 2 per-
cent, on average, in the period two quarters
before the acquisition to one quarter after (or
nearly a year, if one includes the acquisition
quarter). My sample includes 197 banks for this
particular comparison, and the p value indicates
that the hypothesis of no change in the acquir-
ing bank’s employment would be rejected at
any reasonable level of significance.
The patterns suggested by table 3 run con-
trary to the accepted wisdom regarding acquisi-
tions and employment. Both the acquiring bank
and its target expanded their payrolls rather
than trimming them. This process took two or
three years, but by the end of that time, both
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the acquirer and its target were employing be-
tween 5 and 7 percent more workers than in
the period just before the acquisition. 
This is not meant to suggest that the acquisi-
tion caused the employment gain. Indeed, the
most plausible story is that banks in growing
markets tend to get bigger—in part by acquir-
ing other banks, which can then participate in
the expanding market. The employment pattern
of acquiring banks prior to acquisition shows
that they are in fact generally growing before
takeover. (The same is not true of the targets.)
However, the evidence does refute the com-
monly held idea that acquisitions are usually
accompanied by large employment cuts. Four
years after acquisition, targets average nearly 
5 percent more workers.
The regression analyses reported in table 4
support the notion that banks involved in an ac-
quisition are generally expanding; however, the
acquisition slows their growth. The fixed-effect
estimates basically reinforce the OLS estimates.
Acquisitions do cause a drop in employment,
but the effect is small: Three years after a take-
over, a bank may see its payroll shrink about 2
to 4 percent because of the acquisition effect.
(Given that an acquisition has taken place, the
sample average is three years from the takeover
date.) By contrast, all of the small banks in the
acquisition sample experienced secular growth
in employment of 30 percent, even after ac-
counting for the growth of measured variables
included as inputs, outputs, or prices. Size
alone, measured by total assets, accounted for
10 times more of the dynamic employment
effect than did the time from acquisition.
Clearly, there is room for further research.
My acquisition sample is small compared to the
consolidation that has occurred in the industry
over the last decade. Moreover, for all of the
advantages offered by studying acquisitions,
much is left out by excluding mergers. There is
every reason to believe that a merger, which
destroys a bank’s identity, will have a different
employment effect than an acquisition, which
allows that identity to continue. Acquisitions
may occur precisely because the acquirer wants
to keep offices open under the target’s old
name. Thus, a merger may have a larger nega-
tive effect on employment. Future research can
also improve the estimates by documenting the
selectivity effects caused by consolidation.
IV. Conclusion
The primary lesson of the call report data is
that the decline in banking employment over
the last 10 years is a large-bank phenomenon.
A typical small bank experienced no employ-
ment loss when its loan portfolios and real
wage were held constant, whereas the largest
institutions saw their payrolls shrink by nearly
1 percent per quarter, all else equal. In 1984,
the beginning of the sample period, larger
banks employed more workers to service the
same number of loans. By 1996, this differen-
tial had been wiped out. The effect on the
T A B L E 3
Pre- and Post-Acquisition 
Comparisons


























NOTE: The top number is the mean difference in log employment after acqui-
sition versus two quarters before acquisition. The number in parentheses is the
p value for the hypothesis of no difference. The bottom number is the total
number of acquisitions included in the mean.
SOURCE: Author’s calculations.
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industry as a whole has been dramatic, because
large banks employ the lion’s share of the
banking workforce.
There are several possible reasons for the
secular decline in employment within the
nation’s largest banks. One possibility, empha-
sized above, is that these institutions have been
more effective at incorporating technical substi-
tutes for labor than have small banks. A techni-
cal transition in one area of a large bank may
provide important lessons for a transition in a
different area. Also, the fixed costs of a transi-
tion may be amortized over a larger operation,
justifying the technical transformation.
On the other hand, measurement error may
supply just as cogent a reason for the secular
decline in large-bank employment. Large banks
may employ more-skilled workers, allowing
them to hire fewer people. Some supporting
evidence is offered by the fact that larger banks
pay higher average wages than do smaller ones.
In addition, large banks may be more able to
use outside organizations to accomplish tasks
that were once performed in-house. Thus, a
small bank may hire a single person to do its
accounting because the fixed costs of hiring an
outside firm are prohibitive, whereas a larger
bank may use outside consultants who do not
appear on the company payroll. Clearly, further
work is needed before the large-bank effect can
be attributed solely to technical change.
The large-bank effect is big enough to
swamp any of the other possible suspects in
the employment decline. Consolidation’s
impact on the industry’s payrolls amounts to
about a tenth of the large-bank effect. Indeed,
seasonal changes are responsible for more of
the employment variation than is the impact of
industrial structure.
It is fascinating that so little measurable
effect on employment is observed for either the
acquiring bank or its target. Equally intriguing
is the dramatic impact of bank size in explain-
ing the employment changes witnessed over
the last decade. Given this marked empirical
pattern, any research effort that attempts to
properly measure scale economies in banking
should have great relevance in predicting future
employment trends.






Log wage –0.192 –0.233
(5.3) (7.4)
Log price capital 0.070 0.080
(7.1) (7.1)
Log price funds –0.011  –0.0029
(0.28) (0.674)
Log real estate loans 0.0007 0.0258
(0.115) (2.9)
Log commercial/ 0.004 0.0222
industrial loans (0.382) (3.2)
Log other loans 0.122 0.0983
(4.1) (3.3)
Log core deposits 0.039 0.135
(0.938) (2.1)






Post-acquisition dummy –0.0007 –0.002
(0.095) (0.178)




Log total assets 0.606 0.507
(7.43) (7.2)
Log total assets * time –0.00103 –0.0017
(2.5) (2.3)
Number of observations 7,040 6,951
Number of banks 315 315
NOTE: Numbers in parentheses are t ratios.
SOURCE: Author’s calculations.
http://clevelandfed.org/research/review/
Economic Review 1997 Q333
References
Berger, A.N., and D.B. Humphrey. “Measure-
ment and Efficiency Issues in Commercial
Banking,” in Z. Griliches, ed., Output Meas-
urement in the Service Sectors. Chicago: Uni-
versity of Chicago Press, 1992, pp. 245–79.
_________ , and _________. “Efficiency of
Financial Institutions: International Survey
and Directions for Future Research,” Euro-
pean Journal of Operational Research, vol.
98, no. 2 (April 16, 1997), pp. 175–363.
Berger, A.N., A.K. Kashyap, and J.M. Scalise.
“The Transformation of the U.S. Banking
Industry: What a Long, Strange Trip It’s
Been,” Brookings Papers on Economic Activ-
ity, vol. 2 (1995), pp. 55–201.
Boyd, J.H., and M. Gertler. “Are Banks Dead?
Or Are the Reports Greatly Exaggerated?”
National Bureau of Economic Research,
Working Paper No. 5045, February 1995.
Demsetz, R. “The Re-Tooling of the Banking
Industry: Evidence from Industry Employ-
ment,” Federal Reserve Bank of New York,
unpublished manuscript, 1997.
Fixler, D. “Measuring Financial Service Output
and Prices in Commercial Banking,” in Z.
Griliches, ed., Output Measurement and the
Real Output of Banks. University of Chicago
Press, 1992.
Griliches, Z. “Comments on Measurement
Issues in Relating IT Expenditures to Pro-
ductivity Growth,” Economics of Innovation
and New Technology, vol. 3, nos. 3/4 (1995),
pp. 317–21.
Hamermesh, D.S. “The Demand for Labor in
the Long Run,” in O. Ashenfelter and R.
Layard, eds., Handbook of Labor Economics.
New York: North-Holland, 1986, pp. 429–71.
__________. Labor Demand. Princeton, N.J.:
Princeton University Press, 1993.
Humphrey, D.B. “Cost and Technical Change:
Effects from Bank Deregulation,” Journal of
Productivity Analysis, vol. 4 (June 1993),
pp. 9–34.
_________, and Pulley, L.B. “Banks’ Responses
to Deregulation: Profits, Technology, and
Efficiency,” Journal of Money, Credit, and
Banking, vol. 29, no. 1 (February 1997), 
pp. 73–93.
http://clevelandfed.org/research/review/
Economic Review 1997 Q3